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I. CYCLES IN DEFENSE
Many aspects of war and national defense appear to run in cycles.
Indeed, the identification and explanation of these cycles is a favorite
pastime of military scholars. Historians and political scientists charac-
terize war as alternating cycles of offensive and defensive dominance.1
The idea of cyclicality may in fact be hardwired into academic discus-
sions and understandings of war. For example, early war theorist Carl
von Clausewitz described an ever-changing character of war under-
girded by war’s fundamentally unchanging nature.2 Because the domi-
nant theoretical understanding of war is that it holds a mixture of both
fixed and constantly evolving elements, our concept of war may inher-
ently lend itself to the idea of cycles. At the same time, however, the
identification of cycles in war and national defense can be seen empir-
ically. For example, the United States defense budget since World War
† Andrew Hunter is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and a
senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.  He focuses on issues affecting the
industrial base, including emerging technologies, sequestration, acquisition policy, and
industrial policy. From 2011 to November 2014, Mr. Hunter served as a senior execu-
tive in the Department of Defense.
1. See Marco Nilsson, Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security
Dilemma, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 467 (2012).
2. See Christopher Mewett, Understanding War’s Enduring Nature Alongside its
Changing Character, WAR ON ROCKS (Jan. 21, 2014), https://warontherocks.com/2014/
01/understanding-wars-enduring-nature-alongside-its-changing-character/ [https://per
ma.cc/8L3P-57HM] (discussing Clausewitz’s distinction between the unchanging na-
ture of war and its changing character over time).
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II is notoriously cyclical, running through peaks and troughs in con-
stant dollar terms roughly every fifteen to twenty years.3 Since peak
defense funding periods do not always align with periods of war, it is
not the dynamics of war alone that drive cyclical United States de-
fense budgets but a mix of phenomena that includes economic cycles.
Hence, in noting the cyclical nature of many aspects of defense, his-
torians must further investigate to determine what dynamics and con-
straints may be at play in driving the cycle.
II. CYCLICALITY AND ACQUISITION REFORM
The acquisition of defense capabilities is an essential component of
national defense and one that has generated calls for reform since the
beginning of the Republic. United States defense acquisition started
with the acquisition of supplies, including food, for the Continental
Army and Navy (literal pork barrel spending) that quickly developed
an unfavorable reputation. Complaints about the failings of the de-
fense acquisition system, and of the many efforts to reform it, have
continued ever since. The young United States government decided to
build its first six frigates as a foundation for the United States Navy in
the 1790s, which quickly established a pattern that would recur later—
all six ships went well over budget and became substantially delayed
in delivery. The problems encountered in building the six frigates led
to congressional investigations. These ships, however, also proved to
be superior in actual combat operations against the world’s best na-
vies.4 Subsequent acquisition reforms spawned the passage of the
False Claims Act during the Civil War to punish those supplying
shoddy supplies to the Army of the Potomac,5 and the Truman Com-
mittee, which targeted war profiteering during World War II.6 One of
the hallmarks of the long history of defense acquisition reform in the
United States from the earliest days of the Republic to today is the
sense that we have not solved the problem.
Other authors have observed and studied clear periods or phases of
defense acquisition reform in the United States.7 This Article ad-
3. See Todd Harrison, Analysis of the FY 2017 Defense Budget, CTR. FOR STRA-
TEGIC & INT’L STUDIES 11 (2017), https://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/08/Analysis-of-the-FY-2017-Budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJJ4-GX7G] (discuss-
ing the national defense budget outlay cycles after World War II).
4. See Mark F. Cancian, Cost Growth: Perception and Reality, DEF. ACQUISITION
UNIV. (2010), http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA523912 [https://perma.cc/
5RLH-NRGV] (discussing the six frigates and cost growth in defense acquisition
generally).
5. See The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf [https://perma
.cc/KS4J-RXJ3].
6. See The Truman Committee, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhis-
tory/history/minute/The_Truman_Committee.htm [https://perma.cc/TC33-HXEH].
7. See David L. McNicol & Linda Wu, Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition
Policy and Process on Cost Growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs, INST.
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vances the proposition that the progression of defense acquisition re-
form phases is cyclical—that is, a repeating pattern. This cyclicality
occurs because defense acquisition is an effort to balance the enduring
elements of acquisition—priorities of cost, schedule, and perform-
ance—with the evolving needs of the United States military and the
advancing horizons of technology, which are driven by the changing
character of war. Cyclicality in acquisition reform, and the dynamics
that drive it, can provide insights into the continual frustration with
acquisition reform efforts. Acquisition reform creates a cycle of dis-
crete ideas and policy prescriptions, which take turns being au cou-
rant. At different times in the acquisition reform cycle, a different
acquisition priority predominates, giving rise to related policy pre-
scriptions which are often later undone when the priority shifts. For
example, the focus of acquisition reform has shifted over time from
the following events: (1) development principles that David Packard
promulgated in the 1970s;8 (2) to a focus on buying commercial items
in the 1990s; (3) to handing off management responsibility to industry
through Total Systems Performance Responsibility (“TSPR”) or lead
system integrator in the 2000s; and (4) to the cost control focus of the
Better Buying Power initiative in 2010.9 For the defense industry, be-
ing in tune with and anticipating these changes in the defense acquisi-
tion reform cycle is critical to its business. For many other observers,
these policy shifts are exasperating, giving evidence that reform never
works and that the government tried every possible policy solution
without apparent success.
If acquisition reform is truly cyclical due to the military’s shifting
needs and competing priorities, however, it might be that acquisition
policies often deliver the results they were designed to achieve. How-
ever, frequently, those results fail to satisfy us. By the time they arrive,
our perceived needs have changed, and we have moved on to a differ-
ent priority, from a focus on cost, for example, to a focus on speed or
performance. In an ideal world, we would shift priorities exactly when
circumstances demand. We would optimize the acquisition system to
the new ranking of priorities, and we would keep acquisition at the
frontier of the Pareto function10 that best balances cost, schedule, and
FOR DEF. ANALYSES (2014), https://www.acq.osd.mil/parca/docs/ida-p5126.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/5PCM-QS6F] (discussing periods of acquisition reform after 1970).
8. See Frank Kendall, The Original Better Buying Power—David Packard Acqui-
sition Rules 1971, DEF. AT&L MAG. 2 (May–June 2013), http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/
2013/06/Kendall.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGS8-6UZW].
9. See J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal,
U.S. ARMY CTR. MIL. HIST. (2011), https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/
11-120_e628824d-3f2d-45bc-9c07-f5b056955e50.pdf [https://perma.cc/H944-LEJ8].
10. See G. Agrawal, et al., Intuitive Visualization of Pareto Frontier for Multi-Ob-
jective Optimization in n-Dimensional Performance Space, AM. INST. OF AERONAU-
TICS AND ASTRONAUTICS (2004), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/63dd/ea17dbecfc43
042d6ddc15803824e35cfab9.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK4C-GCYA] (discussing Pareto
optimality and visualizing a Pareto frontier).
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performance. In the real world, it is likely that the acquisition system
is slow to respond to shifting priorities, meaning that although we may
be operating at the Pareto frontier, we are not getting the results we
desire.11 We may also operate well inside the Pareto frontier for ex-
tended periods due to weaknesses in the government’s acquisition
workforce and/or the industrial base that undermines acquisition per-
formance irrespective of the nature of the policy regime. In this model
of cyclical acquisition reform, there is likely to be substantial dissatis-
faction with the acquisition system much of the time, even during peri-
ods when it is operating at the Pareto efficiency frontier and in
accordance with the duly established policy priorities of prior regimes.
III. THE END OF THE COST CONTROL ERA
The current situation with defense acquisition reform provides an
interesting case study in these dynamics, as it clearly reflects a major
priority shift that signals the beginning of a new phase in the cycle.
Starting in 2008 through approximately 2014, cost control was the cen-
tral priority of acquisition reform. Congress embraced this priority
with the passage of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009 (“WSARA”). WSARA focused on the following initiatives: (1)
ensuring the development of independent cost estimates of major de-
fense acquisition programs; (2) understanding the risk in weapons de-
velopment; and (3) making trade-offs between cost, schedule, and
performance.12 Likewise, the Department’s internal Better Buying
Power initiative featured several elements that focused on cost con-
trol, including increased use of competition and fixed price con-
tracting, as well as implementation of cost targets.13 The passage of
the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the triggering of budget cuts
through sequestration in 2013 only reinforced the focus on cost con-
trol as the major priority in the acquisition system.14
11. In fact, a CSIS study of acquisition reform found that results from policy
changes generally lag policy implementation by at least two years. Rhys McCormick,
Measuring the Outcomes of Acquisition Reform by Major DoD Components, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 54 (2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/measuring-out-
comes-acquisition-reform-major-dod-components [https://perma.cc/J33R-7C75].
12. See David J. Berteau, et al., Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisi-
tion Reform Act of 2009: A Progress Report, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.
(2010), https://www.csis.org/analysis/implementation-weapon-systems-acquisition-re-
form-act-2009 [https://perma.cc/92KF-NDQV].
13. See DoD’s initial implementation memo for the Better Buying Power Initia-
tive at Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in
Defense Spending, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (June 28, 2010), https://www.ustranscom.mil/dbw/
docs/BBP_USD_Memo_Acquisition_Professionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QBE-EK
HN].
14. It is important to acknowledge that the Department of Defense and the de-
fense acquisition system are both large and sophisticated enough to work towards
multiple priorities at the same time. During the period from 2005–2014, DoD was also
successfully working to rapidly acquire capabilities to fulfill urgent operational needs
for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This effort was critically important not only for
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Starting in about 2014, however, acquisition priorities began a sig-
nificant shift due to concerns raised by Department of Defense
(“DoD”) leaders, stating that potential competitors such as Russia
and China were catching up with the United States and that the
United States technological advantage was eroding.15 The earlier fo-
cus on cost control inadequately addressed this problem, and in some
respects, could even be viewed as potentially inhibiting the develop-
ment of a next generation of technology. Inside the DoD, this shift
took the form of an update to the Better Buying Power Initiative
known as Better Buying Power 3.0. In this update, the Department
emphasized sharing information between the DoD and industry on
the development of and investment in new technologies; removing
barriers to the utilization of commercial technologies; and making de-
fense systems easier to upgrade through an engineering approach
known as modular open systems architecture.16 The DoD also em-
barked on developing a Long-Range Research and Development plan
to guide efforts at recapturing areas of technological advantage. Much
of the focus was systemic and long term, laying a foundation to deliver
or recapture advantages five to ten years down the line. In order to
demonstrate progress on a more rapid timeline, the DoD also created
a new organization, the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
(“DIUx”). The DIUx engages in outreach with the rapidly growing
technology sector in Silicon Valley and other non-traditional defense
contractors who might deliver solutions developed to meet more rapid
entrepreneurial timelines.17 The DoD also revealed the existence of
the relatively new Strategic Capabilities Office (“SCO”), which fo-
cused on doing rapid demonstrations and prototyping of new sys-
tems—usually ones that took a less traditional or cost-imposing
approach to defeating enemy capabilities.18 SCO’s approach stood in
its operational impacts but also because it demonstrated the ability of the acquisition
system to operate with speed and agility when given that mandate. However, rapid
acquisition, and the practices followed to implement it, were largely confined to meet-
ing urgent operational needs, a fairly narrow subset of defense acquisition, and speed
was not adopted as a systematic priority during this period of time.
15. See David Alexander & Andrea Shalal, Hagel Announces Push to Boost U.S.
Military’s Technological Edge, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2014, 7:13 PM), https://www.reut
ers.com/article/us-usa-defense-hagel-innovation/hagel-announces-push-to-boost-mili-
tarys-technological-edge-idUSKCN0J000B20141116 [https://perma.cc/V7X5-QG7N].
16. For a discussion of Better Buying Power 3.0, see Andrew Philip Hunter and
Denise E. Zheng, Better Buying Power 3.0: DoD’s New Plan for Technical Excellence
and Innovation, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.csis
.org/analysis/better-buying-power-30-dods-new-plan-technical-excellence-and-innova-
tion [https://perma.cc/6ZHU-2FHN].
17. The beginnings of DIUx are described in Fred Kaplan, The Pentagon’s Innova-
tion Experiment, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.technologyreview
.com/s/603084/the-pentagons-innovation-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/TQT9-ZV
QB].
18. The origin and purpose of SCO are explained in Cheryl Pellerin, DoD Strate-
gic Capabilities Office is Near-Term Part of Third Offset, DOD NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/995438/dod-strategic-capabilities-off
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contrast to typical defense programs that focus on building expensive
multi-mission systems designed to combat the full range of threats
presented by our most capable adversaries.
IV. CONGRESS TURNS THE HELM ON ACQUISITION REFORM
However, the close coordination between the DoD and Congress
that characterized the WSARA era did not carry over smoothly as this
acquisition reform shift occurred. While Congress agreed with the
DoD that the erosion of the United States technological advantage
was real and sought to accelerate implementation of modular open
systems architecture, it did not find satisfaction with the policy ap-
proach taken by the DoD. As another key solution to the acquisition
reform problem, Congress reshaped and reduced the size of offices in
the Pentagon that manage the acquisition system. Congress’s priority
quickly shifted from ensuring that the DoD had the systematic disci-
pline necessary for cost control, exemplified by the mandates included
in WSARA, to a priority on speeding up acquisition decision making
by removing decision making layers.
In the Fiscal Year 2016, Congress began this process of removing
decision making layers  in the National Defense Authorization Act
(“NDAA”) by statutorily delegating final authority for approving ma-
jor investment programs like Navy ships, Army fighting vehicles, and
Air Force jets, so-called milestone decision authority, from the Secre-
tary of Defense’s office down to acquisition officials in the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. In the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, Congress then
mandated that the central acquisition authority in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (“OSD”), the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, be split up into two offices.
The first office focused on developing a culture of rapid and strategic
innovation at the DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering, and the second office focused on setting policy gui-
dance for purchasing and sustaining major weapon platforms, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. The de-
tails of how these new offices would divide their responsibilities,
which had previously been part of a unified organization, were largely
left for the DoD to decide. However, these new offices still had to
meet a congressional requirement focused on reducing the size of the
headquarter’s offices in the DoD by 25 percent, meaning that the two
new offices created would be significantly smaller than the one office
they replaced.19 The DoD argued against making these changes as
ice-is-near-term-part-of-third-offset/source/GovDelivery/ [https://perma.cc/5R7S-8C
XE].
19. For a discussion of how the creation of the USD R&E and USD A&S was
adopted and the mandate for 25% reduction, see DoD Plan to Split Acquisition Du-
ties, EVERYCRSREPORT (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IN
10755.html [https://perma.cc/BA9Q-7J4Q]. DoD’s plan for the new organizational
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they moved through the legislative process, but ultimately accepted
the division of acquisition functions in the final legislation presented
to and signed by President Obama.20
Other acquisition changes in this period reflected a more coopera-
tive approach between the DoD and Congress, including changes de-
signed to expand the DoD-funded prototyping and advanced
component development and to ease access to commercial items
which require little to no specialized development for use in military
applications. In Fiscal Year 2017, the NDAA mandated the creation of
special funds21 and oversight boards within each military department22
to support the development of prototypes and weapon system compo-
nents. This approach seeks to create a separate management structure
for activities in the middle stages of the technology development cy-
cle. The middle stages occur after promising new technologies are pio-
neered but before they are integrated into a traditional development
program as part of an overall system design and enter production.23
The intent was to support technologies as they transition across the
so-called “valley of death” between laboratory and factory with the
goal of allowing for the increased maturation of technologies before
the DoD incorporates them into weapon system designs.24 In addition
to fostering technology through bettering its chances of survival in
transition, this structure is intended to allow technology to develop
more independently and aggressively from the existing program struc-
ture. Because the acquisition system has been organized almost en-
tirely around large acquisition programs, formally known as major
structure submitted to Congress in August, 2017 can be found at Report to Congress
Restructuring the Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Or-
ganization and Chief Management Officer Organization, MILITARYTIMES (Aug. 2017),
https://ec.militarytimes.com/static/pdfs/embargoed-section-901-fy-2017-ndaa-report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ56-FG8X].
20. For DoD reaction to the split-up of AT&L, see Aaron Mehta, Frank Kendall
on the NDAA and the End of AT&L, DEF. NEWS (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.defen-
senews.com/digital-show-dailies/reagan-defense-forum/2016/12/03/frank-kendall-on-
the-ndaa-and-the-end-of-at-l/ [https://perma.cc/K5GP-32WK]. For DoD’s response to
milestone decision authority delegation, see Scott Maucione, Kendall Voluntarily
Loosens Grip on Some Acquisition Powers, FED. NEWS RADIO (Sept. 18, 2015, 5:49
PM), https://federalnewsradio.com/defense/2015/09/kendall-voluntarily-loosens-grip-
acquisition-powers/ [https://perma.cc/W8VZ-G53D].
21. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-
328, § 804, 130 Stat. 2000, 2250–51 (2016) (originally the House bill created separate
funds for each military department, but the final version of the legislation created
subaccounts for the military departments within an existing but previously dormant
fund known as the Defense Modernization Account).
22. See DoD 101: Overview of the Department of Defense, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https:/
/www.defense.gov/About/DoD-101/ [https://perma.cc/7565-HSRB] (last visited Aug.
9, 2018).
23. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 § 806, 130 Stat.
at 2256–60.
24. See Anthony Davis & Tom Ballenger, Bridging the “Valley of Death”, DEF.
AT&L MAG. 13–17 (Jan.–Feb. 2017), http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2016/12/Davis_Bal
lenger.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4N6-ZBTV].
44 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
defense acquisition programs, there are currently limited resources
available to carry forward technologies that demonstrate success in
the early stages of development independent of these major programs.
Additionally, because there is a limited capacity for risk-taking in ma-
jor investment programs, this system creates something of a disincen-
tive for the adoption of technologies that have only recently been
developed. Implementation of this new management structure for
technology development, however, remains somewhat nascent.
Congress created pathways that allow the military departments to
bypass the traditional acquisition program structure entirely. In Sec-
tion 804 of the Fiscal Year 2016, NDAA created the authority for
these alternative acquisition pathways, specifying the creation of a
pathway for rapid prototyping and a pathway for rapid fielding. In the
Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA, Congress exempted programs utilizing these
alternative acquisition paths from coverage under the traditional over-
sight regime, known as the DoD Instruction 5000.02.25 Congress left it
to the DoD to fill in the details about how this alternative system
would operate differently from the traditional acquisition system. This
open-ended legislative approach gives the DoD maximum flexibility
in designing alternative processes, but also makes it less likely that the
DoD will successfully overcome the inherent inertia associated with
doing things outside of regular order. The DoD did not raise objec-
tions to these systemic changes relating to technology development
and alternative acquisition pathways, but it initially approached the
task of implementing them fairly slowly. And up until the latest
budget request, for Fiscal Year 2019, little to no funding has been allo-
cated by either the DoD or the congressional appropriations commit-
tees for either the service-level technology development funds or a
rapid prototyping fund created by Congress.
Another recent development in acquisition reform concerns acces-
sing commercial technology. The DoD and Congress spent much of
the cost control period of acquisition reform focused on tightening the
definition of commercial items and increasing requirements for con-
tractors to supply cost data to justify their pricing. In the last several
NDAAs, Congress passed several provisions designed to make it eas-
ier to price and purchase commercial items. In order to streamline
existing processes for acquiring commercial technology, Congress
clarified the process for deciding whether to use streamlined proce-
dures in buying commercial items (known as a commercial item deter-
mination)26 particularly for systems previously purchased as com-
25. See Ashton Carter, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, U.S. DEP’T DEF.
(Nov. 26, 2013), https://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/DSD%205000.02_Memo‡oc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VSA6-YT4Y].
26. See generally Claire M. Grady, Guidance on Commercial Item Determinations
and the Determination of Price Reasonableness for Commercial Items, U.S. DEP’T
DEF. (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA003554-16-
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mercial items. They made clear that the intellectual property rights for
commercial items, a key element of ensuring that companies receive a
return on their investment in these technologies, remains with the
commercial supplier. Congress also limited the DoD’s ability to re-
quest data on costs for commercial items. Finally, Congress authorized
the DoD to use streamlined commercial items procedures for military-
purpose non-developmental items from non-traditional defense
suppliers.
V. ASSESSING PRIORITIES IN THE CURRENT
ACQUISITION REFORM CYCLE
With the change of leadership at the Pentagon after the Presidential
transition in 2017, the DoD’s approach to congressionally-mandated
acquisition reform changed as well. For example, incoming officials
embraced the congressional changes that the DoD previously resisted
by delegating oversight of almost all current acquisition programs to
the military departments.27 And while dramatic moves such as the
near total delegation of Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(“MDAPS”) to the military departments show the sharp change in the
DoD’s approach, more systemic changes emerged slowly due to the
new administration’s extended timeline in appointing acquisition lead-
ership positions. Now, however, the team is largely set, including the
following: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Michael Griffin, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sus-
tainment Ellen Lord; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology Bruce Jette; Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development, and Acquisition James “Hondo” Geurts;
and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition William
Roper. These officials have made extensive comments, identifying
their priority as the speed in the development and deployment of new
technology.28 In addition, the National Defense Strategy (“NDS”) is-
sued by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis early in 2018, identified a
strategic imperative in preparing for competition with potential peer
DPAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4K8-YS6B] (an overview of commercial item
determination).
27. See generally Aaron Mehta, Policy Shift: DoD is Pushing Major Program
Management Back to the Military, DEF. NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.defen-
senews.com/pentagon/2017/12/11/policy-shift-dod-is-pushing-major-program-manage-
ment-back-to-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/A789-8Q7Y] (explaining the evidence of
the different approach to milestone decision authority delegation in the Trump
Administration).
28. See Lisa Fernandino, Speedier Acquisition Needed to Stay Competitive, Defense
Official Says, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/
Article/1459494/speedier-acquisition-needed-to-stay-competitive-defense-official-
says/ [https://perma.cc/EW5V-Q42C]; see also Caroline Houck, ‘Surprising Capabili-
ties’ Guru Tapped to Lead Air Force Acquisition, DEF. ONE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://
www.defenseone.com/business/2018/01/surprising-capabilities-guru-tapped-lead-air-
force-acquisition/144940/ [https://perma.cc/EH7W-SLZ8].
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competitors such as China and Russia. The NDS called for an ex-
panded effort to foster and implement innovation, including accessing
non-traditional private sector partners as part of a National Security
Innovation Base. The heavy emphasis on peer competitors in the
DoD’s strategic guidance may result in new investments in traditional
high-end combat capabilities such as hypersonic missiles, heavy tanks,
and artillery systems.
While the combination of new policy direction from Congress, new
rhetoric from acquisition leaders, and new strategic guidance are mov-
ing the DoD away from the prioritization of cost control, it remains
less clear which priority is taking its place in the lead position. Both
schedule and performance appear to have their champions for being
today’s top acquisition priority. It bears noting that trying to identify
the new leading priority for acquisition reform is not to suggest that
the acquisition system has to, or in fact does, respond to only one
priority at a time. In fact, a major thesis of this Article is that the
acquisition system must necessarily balance the competing priorities
of cost, schedule, and performance. But different policy approaches
will dominate depending on how they strike this balance, and how
these priorities are ranked relative to one another. And the question
of how the DoD and Congress rank the priorities, and whether the
two ranking methods are aligned, is of central importance.
The final answer on our current balance of priorities is likely to
emerge over time, but a compelling signal comes from examining re-
cently implemented acquisition policy measures and the acquisition
debates to which those policies are responding. The strong emphasis
in these new acquisition policies and debates is the push for expanded
rapid prototyping, technology transition and insertion, and access to
commercial technology. These policies are more consistent with a
push for increased acquisition speed than they are with a push for
cutting-edge performance. The historical parallels offered by acquisi-
tion reform cycles of the 1990s reinforce this evidence. In that time,
the DoD was coming off of the Reagan defense build-up of the 1980s
that focused heavily on expanding the Navy fleet and fielding the ad-
vanced systems conceived in the 1970s, such as the Army’s Big Five
weapon systems29 and the B-2 bomber. In response to the Reagan-era
acquisition challenges, the Packard Commission recommended con-
solidating the acquisition authority and the acquisition chain of com-
mand under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.30 In the
29. See generally Andrew Hunter & Rhys McCormick, The Army Modernization
Imperative: A New Big Five for the Twenty-First Century, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD. (May 31, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/army-modernization-imper-
ative [https://perma.cc/XM58-T4QV] (a discussion of the Army’s Big Five; the
Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Blackhawk Helicopter, Apache Helicopter,
and Patriot Air Defense System).
30. David Packard, et al., A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President,
PRESIDENT’S BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON DEF. MGMT. xxiv (June, 1986), https://www
2019] THE CYCLES OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 47
1990s, the new Under Secretary’s signature policy initiative focused on
leveraging the commercial market’s efficiencies to reduce timelines,
improve quality, and limit unique costs in defense acquisition.31 This
initiative took fruition with the passage of the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”), much of which was embodied in
Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 12, designed to put in place a
preference for buying commercial items and to streamline their
purchasing.32
The current focus on streamlining access to commercial technology
shortly after a focus on reengineering institutional controls in the ac-
quisition chain of command suggests that the acquisition system is un-
dergoing a policy transition cycle very similar to one that it
experienced in the late 1990s. This cycle, however, is more of a rein-
terpretation than a rerun since the character of war and the technol-
ogy needed to fight it has changed. This time, the focus on accessing
commercial technology is less about using commercial parts as a
means of cost and quality control, and more about tapping into inno-
vation in the commercial market, particularly commercial information
technology (“IT”). These dynamics were most prominent in the acqui-
sition reforms included in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA and other
emerging acquisition debates in the last year.
VI. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IS DRIVING THE
ACQUISITION REFORM DEBATE
In the most recent year, the efforts to change the acquisition of IT
accounted for much of the energy in acquisition reform. From general
matters of software acquisition and development, to online market-
places, to cloud computing and artificial intelligence, acquisition of IT
is energizing the discussion for the need for accelerated acquisition
processes and access to commercial technology in military
applications.33
The most controversial debate of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA was
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry’s pro-
.documentcloud.org/documents/2695411-Packard-Commission.html [https://perma.cc/
4SMV-74ZN] [hereinafter The Packard Commission].
31. See Jacques Gansler & William Lucyshyn, Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS):
Doing it Right, CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & PRIV. ENTER. (Sept. 2008), http://www.dtic
.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a494143.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBA2-GC3R] (discussing the im-
portance of purchasing commercial items written by the then Under Secretary of De-
fense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Jacques Gansler).
32. See Ronald Falcone & Jean Lohier, The Formation, Evolution, and Devolution
of Commercial Items Acquisition in the U.S. Federal Government, CONTRACT MGMT.
(May 2015), https://www.ncmahq.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/
m/articles/cm0515—-12-21 [https://perma.cc/D7XN-NVWN] (discussing the history of
FASA and commercial item purchasing procedures).
33. See Darrell Issa, Crafting 21st Century IT Reform, NEXTGOV (Sept. 20, 2012),
https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2012/09/commentary-crafting-21st-century-it-re-
form/58234/ [https://perma.cc/PL4K-G229].
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posal to provide the DoD with the authority to establish one or more
online marketplaces to facilitate the kind of business-to-business
purchases that are increasingly prevalent in the private sector.34 For
example, a DoD buyer would potentially be able to use such an online
marketplace to purchase commercial artificial intelligence applica-
tions for use with sensitive military data, or to acquire commercially
available tools for repairing military aircraft. The proposal somewhat
resembled an existing online marketplace the CIA created for the in-
telligence community.35 The proposed marketplace would be designed
to ease the DoD’s access to commercial products and technology, a
partially realized goal of FASA. Under the proposal, once an online
marketplace was certified for the program, buying from that market-
place would complete the following: satisfy the requirement for com-
petition; meet the definition of purchasing a commercial item; and
ease the process of determining fair and reasonable pricing, domestic
content, and fulfillment of small business standards.36 During the de-
bate of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA on the House floor, the proposal
was expanded to become an online marketplace for the entire federal
government administered by the General Services Administration
(“GSA”), which already serves as a central hub for acquisition of
commercial items through a mechanism known as the Federal Supply
Schedule.37
Chairman Thornberry’s online marketplace proposal proved con-
troversial because of a perception that the comprehensive nature of
the marketplace, as well as the streamlined process advantages it of-
fered, could compromise opportunities for competition in federal ac-
34. Jake Jedlicka, NDAA Commercial Marketplace Proposal Could Herald Big
Changes to Procurement Landscape, FEDBID (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.fedbid.com/
blogs/ndaa-commercial-marketplace-proposal-could-herald-big-changes-to-procure-
ment-landscape [https://perma.cc/YKM9-4UUD]; see also STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON
ARMED SERVS., 115TH CONG., THE NAT’L DEF. AUTHORIZATION ACT 211 (2017)
(establishing the online marketplaces).
35. See Frank Konkel, CIA is bringing Amazon’s Marketplace to the Intelligence
Community, NEXTGOV (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/
2015/02/cia-bringing-amazons-marketplace-intelligence-community/104937/ [https://
perma.cc/WZ6U-5L38] (describing the CIA’s online marketplace).
36. See U.S. Small Bus. Admin, Size Standards, SBA, https://www.sba.gov/con-
tracting/getting-started-contractor/make-sure-you-meet-sba-size-standards/what-are-
small-business-size-standards [https://perma.cc/96UQ-MVVC] (last visited Aug. 8,
2018) (providing an overview of small business contracting requirements). See Kate
M. Manuel, et.al., Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Comple-
mentary Provisions of Federal Law, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 12, 2016), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R43354.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3E5-SCE3] (discussing domestic content
requirements); see also Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), ACQNOTES, http://
acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerfields/competition-contracting-act-cica [https://perma.cc/
VV6C-8SGY] (last visited Aug. 8, 2018) (overview of  competition requirements
under the Competition in Contracting Act).
37. See Jake Jedlicka, What’s Happening With the NDAA Mandated Marketplace?,
FEDBID (Jan. 18, 2018), http://www.fedbid.com/blogs/whats-happening-with-the-ndaa-
mandated-marketplace [https://perma.cc/S76B-F2CR].
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quisition. In other words, many feared that the marketplace itself
would become a monopoly provider of commercial products and ser-
vices to the government.38 Further, concerns existed that the company
operating the marketplace could use the knowledge of pricing and
government customer interests to its advantage in other areas of gov-
ernment acquisition. A handful of existing online markets that pro-
vide similar services to the federal government on a smaller scale were
concerned that the new marketplace would take away their busi-
nesses, which did not benefit from the process streamlining authorities
provided in Chairman Thornberry’s proposal. The final legislation ad-
dressed these concerns by deferring the program by two years; man-
dating that the program include multiple marketplaces operated by
more than one provider; using the two-year delay to let the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget and GSA develop an imple-
mentation plan for the online marketplace; and requiring the Comp-
troller General of the United States to review and comment on the
implementation plan. Some of the lessons of this debate include the
following: (1) the process of creating large federal online market-
places for commercial products and services will continue; (2) the con-
troversies surrounding this proposal will be litigated again as the
implementation plan is developed and reviewed; and (3) addressing
the complexities of government procurement associated with small
business contracting, competition requirements, and security are not
easily eliminated by use of more commercial mechanisms.
Another central controversy in the debate over acquisition provi-
sions in the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA related to a series of proposals by
the Senate Armed Services Committee to modify the DoD’s approach
to software acquisition.39 These provisions were designed to: (1) direct
the DoD to obtain access to original source code and related technical
data when funding the development of software; (2) pilot the use of
agile developmental approaches for both major software development
programs and some software-intensive warfighting systems; (3) use
open source approaches to developing government-funded software
and attempt to reverse engineer legacy source code; and (4) commis-
sion the Defense Innovation Board40 to do a year-long study on
software acquisition. Much of the controversy over these provisions
38. See Tim Cooke, When Amazon Meets Defense Acquisition, DEF. ONE (Aug.
14, 2017), https://www.defenseone.com/business/2017/08/when-amazon-meets-de-
fense-acquisition/140233/ [https://perma.cc/97YD-8MKW].
39. See Billy Mitchell, Senate NDAA Gives Marching Orders for Pentagon’s JEDI
Cloud, FEDSCOOP (June 6, 2018), https://www.fedscoop.com/senate-ndaa-jedi-cloud-
defense-department-pentagon-dod/ [https://perma.cc/YM5Q-SRG9].
40. The Defense Innovation Board is a federal advisory committee created under
the leadership of former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter that advises the Depart-
ment of Defense on issues of innovation. See Cheryl Pellerin, Carter to Implement 3
Recommendations from Defense Innovation Board, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/989582/carter-to-implement-3-recom-
mendations-from-defense-innovation-board/ [https://perma.cc/XQ5L-T69N].
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related to the hard mandates they established for the DoD and de-
fense contractors, such as requiring them to always deliver original
source code to the government as part of the government’s statutory
rights in technical data and requiring that all unclassified government-
funded software must be included in a public open source repository.
The final legislation retained the basic thrust of these provisions,
generally modifying the language from strict mandates to preferences,
guidelines, or criteria for consideration in contract negotiations. It is
notable that these provisions focused on government-funded software
development and not the acquisition of commercially-developed
software. This may be somewhat counter-intuitive given the generally
accepted notion that when it comes to IT and software, the commer-
cial sector is well ahead of the government sector. These provisions,
however, have more application to commercial software than meets
the eye because in many cases, government-funded software builds
upon the foundation of commercially-developed software. This com-
plexity fuels intense debate over the intellectual property rights in
software and open source requirements because discriminating be-
tween government-funded and truly commercial software remains
challenging.
VII. SEND IN THE CLOUD
A closely-related controversy emerged over the DoD’s plans to
purchase cloud computing capability after the Fiscal Year 2018
NDAA debates concluded. One of the signature initiatives of the new
leadership team at DoD is a plan to transition the department to
cloud capabilities. They established a Cloud Executive Steering
Group, lead by most of the DoD’s senior leadership, with the inten-
tion of accelerating the adoption of “cloud architecture and cloud ser-
vices with a focus on commercial solutions.”41 The group developed a
plan known as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (“JEDI”)
Cloud, under which the DoD will enter into an open-ended contract
arrangement42 with a cloud provider using a competitive contract
process.
The JEDI Cloud contract also demonstrates the propensity for
DoD’s commercial IT acquisition to cause controversy. One central
focus of controversy has been on the DoD’s intent to select a single
provider for JEDI Cloud. Many in the industry have argued that the
41. Accelerating Enterprise Cloud Adoption, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1442705/
accelerating-enterprise-cloud-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/7VME-S8E2].
42. DoD has indicated that it intends to award an indefinite delivery vehicle con-
tract to a single provider using full and open competition. See Frank Konkel, Penta-
gon Releases Second Draft RFP for Multibillion Dollar JEDI Cloud, NEXTGOV (Apr.
16, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2018/04/pentagon-releases-sec-
ond-draft-rfp-multibillion-jedi-cloud/147471/ [https://perma.cc/8ZQY-DPLQ].
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cloud contract should be awarded to multiple vendors. Echoing the
controversy over the proposed online marketplace, this intent to
award to a single provider has raised concerns that the JEDI Cloud
will establish a monopoly within the DoD for cloud computing, ex-
tending major advantages to the winner in the broader government IT
market. The JEDI Cloud would be available to every DoD organiza-
tion interested in making the transition to the cloud, meaning that
JEDI could and likely would develop into the largest cloud provider
across the Department.
The DoD has argued that it is more efficient to consolidate services
on a single cloud platform—a fairly common practice in the commer-
cial sector. It also argues that there are already existing cloud con-
tracts at the DoD that will be left in place, and future cloud initiatives
could be carried out independent of the JEDI Cloud. Thus, concerns
about a monopoly environment are misplaced.
These and related concerns about the structure of the JEDI Cloud
acquisition led Congress to require the DoD to provide two reports on
the topic in the first half of 2018.43 This controversy illustrates that
while Congress and others have urged the DoD to adopt commercial
practices, especially for IT, many complications  that have tradition-
ally  dogged the defense acquisition system, but are largely inapplica-
ble to large commercial concerns, continue to remain prominent. For
example, it remains imperative for the DoD to balance its contract
awards so that long-term supplier relationships and strategic partner-
ships do not preclude the ability to have competition in the future.
As the controversy over JEDI Cloud continued raging, on February
7, 2018, another controversy over cloud computing resulted from the
announcement of an Other Transaction Authority (“OTA”) agree-
ment with REAN Cloud, a commercial cloud provider. This OTA was
initially described as being open to all of the DoD users and poten-
tially valued at $950 million based upon an expectation of widespread
use of the OTA throughout the DoD.44 This led to some initial confu-
sion as to whether the award to REAN Cloud was related to the JEDI
Cloud effort or had effectively preempted it. As a result, the OTA
with REAN Cloud was quickly revised and limited to users of the
United States Transportation Command (“TRANSCOM”), and
descoped to have an expected total value of $65 million.
In fact, the REAN Cloud OTA originated separately  from the
JEDI Cloud. It was a follow-on agreement to an initial prototype
43. See Frank Konkel, Congress Tells Pentagon to Justify Its Single Cloud Plan,
NEXTGOV (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2018/03/con
gress-tells-pentagon-justify-its-single-cloud-plan/146882/ [https://perma.cc/QK9V-FE
GK].
44. See Frank Konkel, Pentagon Releases Second Draft RFP for Multibillion Dol-
lar JEDI Cloud, NEXTGOV (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/it-moderniza-
tion/2018/04/pentagon-releases-second-draft-rfp-multibillion-jedi-cloud/147471/
[https://perma.cc/8ZQY-DPLQ].
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agreement established with help from the DoD’s Silicon Valley of-
fice—DIUx. DIUx facilitated a relationship between TRANSCOM
and REAN Cloud through a limited prototyping OTA. TRANSCOM
awarded the follow-on “production” OTA without further competi-
tion pursuant to authorities provided in the Fiscal Year 2017 NDAA.45
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has subsequently
questioned whether using the follow-on production authority was jus-
tified, arguing that the follow-on production OTA agreement with
REAN Cloud did not meet the requirements of the statutory author-
ity provided in the NDAA.46
VIII. A CONTINUED FOCUS ON COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY
IS IN THE FORECAST
The current acquisition policy cycle will continue to focus on acqui-
sition of commercial technology because an important Congressional
study streamlining the acquisition process recommends extensive
changes in the way the government approaches competition and com-
mercial technology. The project is known as the Section 809 Advisory
Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations, and it
has issued two volumes of a planned three volume set of recommen-
dations for streamlining acquisition.47 The Panel’s recommendations
are detailed and extensive, but perhaps their most meaningful recom-
mendations relate to the acquisition of commercial technology. Con-
ceptually, the Panel calls for a major shift in how the DoD approaches
the marketplace on the front end of the acquisition process. The rec-
ommendations are designed to facilitate increased consideration of
commercial technology solutions to military needs.
Today’s defense acquisition process tends to begin with extensive
internal analysis of military needs, such as repurposing existing assets
and analyzing alternative approaches to acquiring new systems. This
analysis defines a detailed statement of the DoD’s requirements which
is then sent out to industry. While there is often discussion with indus-
try during these early phases of the acquisition process, the request for
proposals (“RFP”) to meet the DoD’s detailed requirements is what
45. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328,
§ 806, 130 Stat. 2000, 2259 (2016) (discussing this authority as provided in Section
2447d of Title 10 of the United States Code as added by Section 806 of the Fiscal Year
2017 NDAA).
46. See Ralph O. White, Press Statement on Bid Protest filed by Oracle, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (May 31, 2018), https://www.gao.gov/press/oracle_bid_
protest.htm [https://perma.cc/3VFU-GHEA] (discussing GAO’s findings in a bid pro-
test against the OTA award filed by Oracle).
47. See Section 809, SEC. 809 PANEL, https://section809panel.org [https://perma.cc/
4MXM-TWBA] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018) (explaining that Section 809 Advisory
Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations was established pursu-
ant to Section 809 of the FY 2016 NDAA for the purpose of reviewing defense acqui-
sition regulations, and the statutes on which they are based, to develop detailed
recommendations for streamlining the acquisition process).
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industry is formally asked to respond to. These RFPs are usually is-
sued on a federal-acquisition-only portal known as FedBizOps that is
not closely monitored by suppliers who seldom do government work.
Further, the large quantity of mandatory DoD requirements in these
RFPs significantly narrows the potential competitors to a handful or
less. The Section 809 Panel argues for “changing DoD’s competitive
procedures to compete solutions to problems, rather than assess a
company’s ability to meet detailed technical specifications,” thereby
shifting “away from spending extensive time defining and validating
requirements, to using more challenge-based competitions or taking
advantage of available market solutions to quickly develop and field
new capabilities.”48
Described as the “the dynamic marketplace,” this approach would
encourage a broader range of companies to engage with the DoD by
offering solutions to military problems before the solution is tightly
defined in a way that lends itself to purpose-built military systems.
Although not explicitly stated by the Section 809 Panel, its recom-
mended approach could facilitate an existing preference for the pro-
curement of commercial items that has existed in federal regulation
since the FASA’s passage, but which may have been a preference in
name only for most defense contracting purposes.49
The Section 809 Panel also recommends that the government
should significantly streamline the transaction rules in the acquisition
process that apply to existing products and services and those that re-
quire customization short of significant new development.50 This will
further incentivize commercial sector firms and other non-traditional
suppliers to participate more broadly in defense acquisitions. While
the specific measures the Section 809 Panel recommends for imple-
menting its dynamic marketplace approach will be included in the yet-
48. Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regu-
lations, SEC. 809 PANEL 8 (2018), https://section809panel.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/Sec809Panel_Vol1-Report_Jan18_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG8N-BK
2Z].
49. See generally Jen Judson, Judge Rules in Favor of Palantir in Lawsuit Against
US Army, DEF. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.defensenews.com/land/2016/10/31/
judge-rules-in-favor-of-palantir-in-lawsuit-against-us-army/ [https://perma.cc/KT44-9T
NU] (discussing a 2016 ruling in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the case Palantir
USG v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 218 (2016), that preemptively terminated a source
selection process for the Army’s Distributed Common Ground System program be-
cause the court found that the Army had not meaningfully considered whether Palan-
tir’s commercial product could meet its requirements).
50. Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regu-
lations, SEC. 809 PANEL (June 2018), https://section809panel.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/Sec809Panel_Vol2-Report_June18.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9YW-T9Y5]. The
Section 809 Panel credits a report from the Center for a New American Security for
its categorization of commercial technology applicable to military needs.  The report
is contained in Ben Fitzgerald, et al., Future Foundry: A New Strategic Approach to
Military-Technical Advantage, CTR. FOR NEW AM. SEC. (2016), https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/future-foundry%2520 [https://perma.cc/RH26-RHQN].
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to-be-issued third volume of its recommendations, one indication of
congressional interest in the Panel’s recommendations relating to
commercial technology is the inclusion of several Section 809 Panel’s
proposed changes to clarify statutory definitions of commercial items
in the House-passed version of the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA.  The full
recommendations of the Section 809 Panel will be ripe for considera-
tion in the Fiscal Year 2020 legislative cycle.
IX. PROSPECTS FOR THE CURRENT AND FUTURE
ACQUISITION CYCLES
While commercial technology continues as a driver of acquisition
speed, especially for IT; the decentralization of acquisition decision-
making and the delegation of decision authority to the military de-
partments will likely encourage different priority balances to emerge
in different sectors of the acquisition system.
The delegation of acquisition authority to the United States Army
has resulted in a significant internal reorganization of its acquisition
functions.51 The Army is, for the first time, establishing a command
focused on bringing together the wide variety of acquisition stake-
holders in one structure, the Army Futures Command. Army Futures
Command will bring the system for deciding requirements for new
capabilities together with the acquisition process. In effect, the Army
consolidates acquisition responsibilities within the service more
closely under the control of the Army Chief of Staff, to whom the
commander of Army Futures Command will report.52 The Army Fu-
tures Command will pursue a new modernization strategy, built
around six major priorities, and hopes to significantly accelerate the
delivery of new capability.53 By centralizing responsibility for require-
ments setting and acquisition execution in one command, the Army
51. The Army’s decision to reorganize its acquisition functions would not have
been prohibited even if milestone decision authority had not been delegated, but the
Army’s interest in pursuing this path was likely spurred by the increased responsibil-
ity for acquisition placed on the Army Chief of Staff. See David Vergun, US Army
Futures Command to Reform Modernization, Says Secretary of the Army, ARMY
NEWS SERV. (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.army.mil/article/197886/ [https://perma.cc/
BU9D-YDWF].
52. Most of the elements of Army Futures Command previously resided in the
Training and Doctrine Command, Army Material Command, Army Test and Evalua-
tion Command, or the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology. For a description, see David Vergun, US Army Futures
Command to Reform Modernization, Says Secretary of the Army, ARMY NEWS SERV.
(Dec. 8, 2017). https://www.army.mil/article/197886/ [https://perma.cc/BU9D-YDWF].
53. For a description of the Army’s modernization priorities, see Patrick Tucker,
US Army Chief Announces Major Reorganization For How Army Develops, Buys
Weapons, DEF. ONE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/10/
feeling-rivals-heat-us-army-streamlining-and-centralizing-way-it-buys-weapons/
141603/ [https://perma.cc/HK8M-VPZD].
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hopes to reduce the friction (and timespan) of coordinating across the
Army’s multiple major communities.
By contrast, the United States Air Force plans to extend its delega-
tion of acquisition authority from OSD by redelegating this authority
down to program executive officers and empowering program manag-
ers.54 This redelegation may reflect the relative maturity of the Air
Force’s major programs, such as the KC-46 tanker and the B-21
bomber, where the high level strategic issues are decided (notably in
both cases with cost control as the major priority), and the focus is on
program execution. Matters of program execution are often best han-
dled at the program level or as close to it as possible.55 However, less
mature parts of the Air Force acquisition portfolio, such as recent ef-
forts to design new systems for command and control and systems de-
signed to approach space as a warfighting domain, may use the same
decentralized authority to achieve different objectives. Notably, Air
Force acquisition executive Will Roper is using the prototyping au-
thority granted by Congress to rapidly demonstrate critical high-per-
formance technologies, such as hypersonic strike systems called for in
the National Defense Strategy.56
Decentralizing and distributing acquisition authority within military
departments may lead to a variety of microcosms within the acquisi-
tion system where the balance of acquisition priorities is different.
Other trends, however, will impact the acquisition system across its
entire scope. Another major trend is the increasing functionality of
weapon systems defined by software over hardware. The capability
seen in the Air Force’s flight lines, in the Army’s motor pools, or in
the Navy’s homeports is increasingly determined by lines of code
rather than steel and aluminum.
This trend has major implications for the acquisition system because
it presents challenges to its basic structure, which was originally de-
signed around an industrial production model. Software-defined sys-
54. As described in testimony from Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson and cited
in Aaron Mehta, Policy Shift: DoD is Pushing Major Program Management Back to
the Military, DEF. NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/
2017/12/11/policy-shift-dod-is-pushing-major-program-management-back-to-the-mili
tary/ [https://perma.cc/VNC8-92LN].
55. For a clear expression of this principle, see DODI 5000.02 Enclosure 13: Ur-
gent Capability Acquisition in Enclosure, AIDA, https://aida.mitre.org/dodi-5000/
rapid-fielding-of-capabilities/ [https://perma.cc/486L-UQYR] (last visited Aug. 21,
2018) (stating “approval authorities for each acquisition program covered by this en-
closure will be delegated to a level that promotes rapid action”).
56. See Aaron Mehta, Air Force Awards Nearly $1 Billion Contract for a Hyper-
sonic Cruise Missile, DEF. NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.defensenews.com/air/
2018/04/18/air-force-taps-lockheed-for-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile/ [https://perma
.cc/ZSK4-7RMZ] (describing the Air Force’s effort to field a hypersonic strike
weapon); Heather Wilson, Air Force Releases FY17 Air Force Acquisition Report, AN-
DREWS GAZETTE (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.dcmilitary.com/andrews_gazette/news/
air-force-releases-fy-air-force-acquisitionreport/article_b5eab9ec-a077-5bb2-9f3c-b1b
499b16fe1.html [https://perma.cc/4NHS-WJZ9].
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tems break down the boundaries around which many organizations
and processes are organized. Software-based systems don’t graduate
from development to production to sustainment like hardware-based
systems, presenting challenges to government budgeting mechanisms
that are leading to calls for new funding categories that can deal with
the iterative nature of software development and production.57
Consider the idea that a system which can send and receive elec-
trons may serve many purposes, such as a communications device, a
sensor, a weapon, and an electronic defense system. Software-based
capabilities are steadily spreading, and they are a powerful reason why
Under Secretary of Defense Ellen Lord appointed a special assistant,
Jeff Boleng, for software acquisition. Boleng will “help oversee the
development of software development policies and standards across
DoD and offer advice on commercial software development best prac-
tices to Pentagon leadership . . . .”58 Perhaps the perfect embodiment
of this trend towards software-driven capabilities is in artificial intelli-
gence. How this trend will affect the balance of acquisition priorities
in the future is difficult to predict, but one thing seems likely: change
will remain dynamic rather than static, leading to continuous acquisi-
tion reform cycles for the years to come.
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ment, AIR FORCE MAG. (July 17, 2017), http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/
2017/July%202017/Pawlikowski-Says-Air-Force-Needs-Faster-Software-Development
.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XLZ-S4YP].
58. Jane Edwards, Report: Jeff Boleng Named DoD’s Special Assistant for Soft-
ware Acquisition, EXECUTIVEGOV (Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.executivegov.com/
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